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Race and Genomics. Old Wine in New 
Bottles? 
Documents from a Transdisciplinary Discussion
Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
From July 25 to 29, 2007, the biennial meeting of the International Society for 
the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB) was hosted 
by the University of Exeter. About 430 papers were submitted, and we had 
the pleasure to put together a programme as well as a plenary session of 
invited speakers on a topic of their choice. After some discussion within the 
programme committee, we decided to organize a session of four speakers 
who were asked to address, each from a diﬀ erent disciplinary perspective, 
the recent re-emphasis on racial categories in genomic studies of ancestry, 
public health, pharmacology, and forensics.1
Th e topic was not only chosen because of its timeliness. It so happened 
that the ISHPSSB meeting also coincided with the tercentenary of both 
Georges Buﬀ on and Carl Linnaeus. Both are arguably the founding fathers of 
modern biology, with the emphasis they put on the reproduction rather than 
the generation of living beings (Müller-Wille/Rheinberger 2007). But there 
is also another legacy of these naturalists, one which is more problematic. 
Th is is racial anthropology which both Buﬀ on and Linnaeus, almost simul-
taneously, initiated by their proposals for a universal partitioning of man-
kind along lines of skin colour, temperament, and descent (Sloan 1995). Th is 
original classiﬁ cation of mankind into three or four major ”races” – a white, 
a black, and a yellow or red one – is still very much in place, even in the 
high-tech contexts of today’s genomics. According to its own rhetoric, for 
example, the International Haplotype Map Project studies human genomic 
variation through four sample “populations” (see http://www.hapmap.org/
abouthapmap.html). Th e choice of these sample populations, however, is re-
vealing: the Yoruba in Ibadan, Nigeria; Japanese from Tokyo; the Han Chi-
nese from Beijing; Utah residents with ancestry from northern and western 
Europe. Th is choice was undoubtedly guided by the colour scheme originally 
proposed by Linnaeus and Buﬀ on. Th e history of race in biology and medi-
cine exhibits a curious mixture of archaic and innovative elements.
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Until very recently there existed a broad consensus among scientists, as 
well as students of science, that racial anthropology belonged to a past thor-
oughly outdated by the combined eﬀ orts of mathematical population genetics 
and molecular biology, a consensus that dates back to the so-called UNESCO 
Statement on Race from 1951. However, in the wake of the completion of the 
Human Genome Project, and with projects like the Human Diversity Project, 
the HapMap Project, various national ‘biobank’ projects, and a diversity of 
private and public initiatives of ‘ancestry’ research, racial categories appear 
to have regained signiﬁ cance in recent years again, inside and outside of the 
biomedical sciences. Human genomic diversity is mapped against grids of ra-
cial distinctions, drugs and life-style recommendations target racially deﬁ ned 
groups, and genetic tests oﬀ er the opportunity to determine ancestry in racial 
terms. Increasingly, close historical scrutiny also reveals that race was not only 
put back on the agenda again occasionally by high-proﬁ le publications like Ri-
chard J. Herrnstein’s and Charles Murray’s Th e Bell Curve (1994), but that it has 
also formed a persistent thread in medical and population genetics research 
throughout the post-WWII era (Pogliano 2005, Wailoo/Pemberton 2006).
To set the stage for the plenary session, we included ﬁ ve questions in the 
letter of invitation that we sent to the four speakers. It may be useful to quote 
them here, as they were originally formulated: “What is it about racial catego-
ries – famously introduced in an ad hoc fashion by Buﬀ on and Linnaeus, and 
again and again denounced as primitive and untenable by prominent life-sci-
entists in the course of their long history – that lets them persist, even in the 
high-tech world of present day genomics and systems biology? Or is this resil-
ience just an illusion? Has ‘race’, just like any other scientiﬁ c concept, acquired 
very diﬀ erent meanings in diﬀ erent historical settings? In that case: How does 
‘race’ in its present usage diﬀ er from ‘race’ in the past? And which recent so-
cial and political developments have triggered its renewed signiﬁ cance?”
Th e four statements that were given in front of the delegates of the 
ISHPSSB meeting on the morning of July 26, 2007, were very diﬀ erent in 
style and perspective. We will not endeavour to distil a common take-home 
message from them, but will let each speak for themselves. One common 
structural element to all of them, however, is probably worth pointing out, 
as it may reﬂ ect the speciﬁ c historical moment in which the session took 
place. Th is is the acknowledgement that “race” is not per se an “irrational” 
concept, but a highly variable and diverse concept that was and continues to 
be shaped by the ways in which science and society are articulated.
Note
1 A webforum that documents the state of discussion when we started to plan the session can 
be accessed at http://www.racesci.org/home.html.
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Is there a Biological Concept of Race?
Jean Gayon
Most contemporary biologists have abandoned the use of the term “race” 
in scientiﬁ c discourse. Other words are used to categorise intra-speciﬁ c 
taxonomic diversity: sub-species, variety, strain, local population, deme, 
etc. Th ese words are ideologically more neutral than “race.” Nevertheless, 
biologists ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult when they discuss with a public that continues to 
use the vocabulary of “race.” For example, when a biologist says “races do not 
exist”, the exact meaning is generally unclear. Does he or she mean that the 
notion of race is confused? Or that the term does have a precise meaning, 
but that what it refers to does not exist, either in nature in general, or among 
humans in particular? Th is is the question I want to examine in two steps. 
STAFFAN MÜLLER-WILLE AND HANS-JÖRG RHEINBERGER
366
First I will consider what the category of race could mean for modern biolo-
gists as a whole; then I will examine those aspects that speciﬁ cally relate to 
humans.
Th e modern view of race among biologists is dominated by their under-
standing of the category of the species. In a remarkable paper on “Species 
Concepts and Species Deﬁ nitions,” Ernst Mayr stated that there are three 
theoretical concepts of the species. Th e ﬁ rst theoretical concept is the ty-
pological species concept, based on the notions of similarity and diﬀ erence. 
Th e biologist using this approach considers the species as a group of individ-
uals who share certain essential properties. Th e second theoretical concept 
is the “nondimensional” concept: “Th e essence of this concept is the rela-
tionship between two coexisting populations in a nondimensional system, 
that is, at a single locality at the same time (sympatric and synchronous)” 
(Mayr 1957: 14). Two individuals, or groups of individuals, are described as 
belonging to two diﬀ erent species if, for instance, they are unable to produce 
fertile oﬀ spring (reproductive isolation). Th is species concept is relational in 
the same way as, for example, “being the brother of ” is a relation and not a 
property inherent to someone. Th e non-dimensional concept is centred on 
a distinctness, and not a diﬀ erence. Th e third theoretical species concept 
Mayr identiﬁ es is the “multidimensional” concept, which deﬁ nes the species 
as a group of interfertile populations distributed in space and time. Th is “col-
lective” species concept is by deﬁ nition “dimensional” because it speciﬁ es 
the spatio-temporal extension of the species. Unlike the non-dimensional 
concept, it does not always lead to clear distinctions.
Mayr’s three theoretical species concepts can help us to clarify the mean-
ing of the concept of biological race. Just as there is a typological species 
concept, there is a typological concept of race. A race is then a class of indi-
viduals who possess a set of essential properties that other individuals do not 
possess. Th ere is no “nondimensional” concept of race, because there is no 
reproductive discontinuity between two sympatric and synchronous races. 
Th e most operational theoretical species concept thus has no equivalent 
concept of race. Th ere is, on the other hand, a “multidimensional” concept of 
race, similar to the multidimensional concept of species. What biologists and 
anthropologists call or have called “races” can be described as populations 
or groups of populations, situated in space and time and forming a real or 
potential reproductive community. When the philosopher Robin Andreasen 
claims that contemporary biologists should admit that human races exist or 
have existed in the past as “clades”, she means no more than this (Andreasen 
1998).
Th us, if we wish to have a biological concept of race, it will be an en-
tity that oscillates between a type and an evolving reproductive community. 
Th e biologist may try to link the two aspects or dissociate them. Th e former 
approach would be that of racial anthropology in the nineteenth and early 





twentieth centuries, which tried to marry the aspects of a classiﬁ catory and 
an evolutionary category. On the other hand, the biologists who developed 
the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s dissociated these two aspects of the 
concept of race. Th eodosius Dobzhansky, for instance, repeatedly argued that 
races as classiﬁ catory groups were mere conventions, whereas the process of 
“raciation”, that is of the diﬀ erentiation of local populations that are partially 
reproductively isolated, is an objective process (Dobzhansky 1937: 39–72). 
A more radical approach – which today is widely adopted and which can 
be traced back to the 1930s – would be to stop talking of races for evolving 
populations, and to banish it from both biology and anthropology (Montagu 
1942, on this attitude, see Gayon 2003).
Debates on the biological relevance of the concept of race generally take 
place with regard to sexually-reproducing organisms, where the reproduc-
tive criterion is so important. I would like to provide a counterpoint to the 
previous discussion by examining a group of organisms for which the con-
cept of race might be clearer than that of species: bacteria.
Bacteria generally reproduce asexually, by simple division. However, some 
bacterial processes allow an exchange of genetic material. Th is exchange is 
quite diﬀ erent from that shown by eukaryotic organisms (I rely here on Co-
han 1996).
1. In most groups of bacteria, genetic recombination is rare. For example, in 
Escherichia coli its frequency is 10–8 per genic segment and per genera-
tion.
2. Bacteria rarely exchange their genes, but they can do so with species that 
are relatively distant in terms of their DNA sequence. Homologous re-
combination can be seen in species that may diverge for up to 25% of the 
sequence of their homologous genes. Th is ﬁ gure is amazingly high. As a 
comparison, even in the most primitive animals the level of divergence is 
not greater than 2%. Furthermore, genes are also exchanged in plasmids, 
with even more divergent forms.
3. Th e quantity of genetic material thus exchanged is small compared with 
the amount exchanged by eukaryotes during a cycle of sexual reproduc-
tion. Whereas a eukaryote receives almost equal amounts of DNA from 
each of its parents, a bacterium receives only a small fraction of the ge-
nome of another individual (a few kilobases, less than 0.1 % of the bacte-
rial genome).
Th ese aspects of bacterial genetic exchange produce evolutionary scenarios 
that are very diﬀ erent from those found in the eukaryotic world. In sexually-
reproducing animals and plants, natural selection has only a limited eﬀ ect 
on genetic diversity. Th e extremely high level of recombination (which is 
strictly speaking maximal because, at each generation, two entire genomes 
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are associated in the same organism) means that an advantageous mutation 
is diﬀ used in a population without bringing with it the whole genome of the 
mutant individual. In bacteria, given that recombination is rare, the selec-
tion of an advantageous mutation carries with it the whole genome of the 
mutant individual. Any natural selection event therefore leads to a “purge of 
diversity” in the local clones. Th erefore genetic exchange does not preserve 
genetic diversity among bacterial populations.
In such a situation, the traditional category of race is much more plausi-
ble than in fully sexually reproducing organisms. A local population, ecologi-
cally adapted, can be characterised both as a robust type (that is, as a class 
of homogeneous individuals) and as an evolutionary line with a limited life-
span. Similarly, the notion of species as a closed reproductive community is 
problematic for bacteria. In reality, bacterial taxa are biological species, that 
is, cohesive and isolated reproductive communities for a fraction of their 
genome only.
Bacteria therefore present us with a set of organisms in which the no-
tion of race is easier to deal with than the notion of species. Locally adapted 
populations of bacteria are good candidates to be considered as races, be-
cause they possess the very properties that make this status so problematic 
in the case of sexually-reproducing plants and animals. Th ey are entities 
that can be described both as types (transitory types, but types neverthe-
less), as temporary but coherent reproductive communities and, further-
more, as reproductive communities that are not isolated from other similar 
groups.
Th is example shows that the category of race is not in and of itself un-
dermined by conceptual problems that make it impossible to apply it to 
any real biological situation. It shows that the pertinence of the category 
of biological race is not only a conceptual question. It also has empirical 
aspects, which I am now going to explore by turning to the particular case 
of humans.
In the case of humans, two diﬀ erent questions should be distinguished. 
(1) What is the biological relevance of the concept of human race? (2) What 
is its social meaning? On the ﬁ rst problem, I will be brief. First, most con-
temporary biologists have given up the use of the word race, because it has 
been so confusing and so dangerous in the past (Provine 1973). But they 
have not renounced to make use of one or the other aspect of the concept of 
race, the classiﬁ catory aspect and the evolutionary aspect (race as an evolv-
ing reproductive community). It depends on the context. Medical genetics, 
for pragmatic reasons, often uses a limited notion of human races as types. 
Human population geneticists have accumulated a tremendous amount of 
data on the evolution of the partially isolated reproductive communities of 
“Modern Man” that have peopled the earth for one or two hundred thousand 
years. Most of these human geneticists avoid using the word “race” (Cavalli-





Sforza et al. 1994). In contrast, medical geneticists are not as much opposed 
to the use of this word. Th is situation conﬁ rms that “race” is decidedly more 
a typological than an evolutionary concept. Of course, medical geneticists do 
not mean that the racial groups they construct are stable and somehow im-
munized against evolution. Th ey merely claim that, in a pragmatic way, these 
racial groups have statistical relevance in given epidemiological situations 
(see Ellison et al. in this issue).
To conclude, I would like to relativize the biological approaches to the 
notion of race in the case of humans, and say that in humans, the most im-
portant aspect of race is not the biological aspect, but rather race as a social 
signiﬁ er. In a remarkable book published around 30 years ago, the sociologist 
Colette Guillaumin argued that we should distinguish two levels of discus-
sion in the question of human races: the “concrete” level which, she argues, 
is that of biological research, and the “symbolic” level, which relates to the 
function of the signiﬁ er “race” in modern societies. Guillaumin insisted that 
the question of race as a social signiﬁ er is separate from that of the result of 
scientiﬁ c debates on races as natural objects. Race as a social operator is not 
so much a concept as a fetish-notion. What is important is not whether it 
exists or not, but what it produces in practice. “Th at [i.e., race] does not ex-
ist. Th at leads to death. It is a murder machine, a technical murder machine. 
Of proven eﬃ  cacy. It is a way of rationalising and organising the murderous 
violence and the domination of some social groups over other social groups 
that have been rendered powerless.” (Guillaumin 1972: 65)
For Guillaumin, symbolic race, although it might not have any objective 
biological meaning, nevertheless maintains a close relation with biological sig-
niﬁ ers. Races are social categories covered in a biological veneer. It does not 
really matter whether this veneer is real, ﬁ ctitious or artiﬁ cial (as for example 
with circumcision amongst Jews). Th e important point is that the social space 
which is the race is marked by a physical trait, an inscription on the body. Th e 
function of this “biologisation” is to radicalise diﬀ erences by presenting them 
as “physical” and “irreversible”. We should never forget this social dimension 
of race. Historically, this notion was primarily built in reference to humans, 
with a clear objective of forming a hierarchy (see Mazzolini in this issue). I 
don’t think that we should be too dogmatic about saying that there is no bio-
logical concept of race. As I have tried to show, this is a rather complex aﬀ air. 
But I do think that the word has been so harmful in the past that we had better 
not use it without being fully aware of its primarily human connotations.
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Th e only way I may contribute to the issue under discussion is by brieﬂ y 
talking about my own research and then by addressing four of the ﬁ ve ques-
tions that have been put on the ﬂ oor by the organizers of this session (see 
introduction). Let me also state straight away that I feel more conﬁ dent with 
literature published between 1600 and 1850 than in contemporary scientiﬁ c 
literature on race and that my knowledge is limited to ideas and theories put 
forth in western Europe and North America.
It is generally assumed that the term race took on a taxonomic mean-
ing at the very end of the eighteenth century. Many of the authors I studied 
worked before that date, before the notion of race was solidiﬁ ed, and they 
investigated skin colour (Mazzolini 1994). It should be noted that in the 
period running from the early seventeenth century to 1800 human pigmen-
tation





- was the object of intense anatomical, microscopical, physiological and 
chemical investigations giving rise to a number of theories which attempt-
ed to explain how human diﬀ erences in skin colour came about;
- was used as the principal marker for classifying human varieties from a 
zoological point of view;
- was viewed as the main trait indicating interracial crossing and thus pro-
vided an element of analysis for what is often called pre-Mendelian genet-
ics;
- stimulated scholars to think about the original colour of mankind by ap-
pearing in pathological conditions such as albinism;
- was the corner stone on which the notion of race was constructed;
- was used to construct powerful models of somatic identities (e.g. white, 
black, yellow, brown and red) which still have far more devastating eﬀ ects 
on human relations than the very notion of race.
Th eories of skin colour cannot be understood without considering slavery 
and colonialism. At the end of the eighteenth century and in the early ni-
neteenth century skin colour was linked to history, civilisation and social 
structure. And so was the notion of race, for which skin colour remained the 
main marker of racial diﬀ erences (Mazzolini 2007). For this reason I stress 
that race is a biopolitical notion, that is, a notion that has been used in daily 
life as well as by the life sciences and the social sciences, with the result of 
reciprocal contaminations. At a historical level this is quite evident. Some 
scholars distinguish four distinct ideas of race: status-race, formal-race, his-
torical-race, and culture-race. From my point of view, it is interesting to note 
that in all these four ideas of race, colour plays a signiﬁ cant role.
Th e ﬁ rst question put to us by the organisers of this session was: “What is 
it about race categories that lets them persist, even in the high-tech world of 
present day genomics and systems biology?” My answer is: First, their persist-
ence is more limited than it used to be and second, when they do persist this 
happens because some race categories are primitive and morphology, or a 
person’s visual appearance, is not eradicated in daily life by statements made 
by academics. I attribute most of this persistence to the political side of the 
notion of race which is still embedded in many Western national cultures.
Th e second question put forward was: “Is the resilience of race categories 
just an illusion?” No, I do not think it is an illusion. An Italian colleague of 
mine, Claudio Pogliano, compared the historical fortune of the notion of 
race to the sun’s transit and said that now the sun of race looks as if it were 
sinking but actually stands still on the horizon in an “unaccomplished sun-
set” (Pogliano 2005).
Th e third question was: “Has ‘race’ just like any other scientiﬁ c concept, 
acquired very diﬀ erent meanings in diﬀ erent historical settings?” In the pref-
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ace to Th e Races of Man of 1850, Robert Knox wrote that “Race is everything: 
literature, science, art, in a word, civilisation, depend on it.” I do not think 
that anyone will subscribe to this statement today. On the other hand, when 
I started my own research in the late 1980s, I was convinced that the scien-
tiﬁ c notion of race, just like the notions of phlogiston, caloric and ether, had 
been consigned to the dustbin of history. To my amazement I now see that 
a limited number of scientists try to pick it up again (see Ellison et al. in this 
issue). As a historian I am therefore forced to take note that aspects of the 
notion of race survive (although they appear to me either dated or unneces-
sary), while as a citizen – in my own Italian environment – I am entitled to 
act in such a way as to make sure that such notions will not be as noxious as 
they have been in the past.
Th e fourth question was: “How does ‘race’ in its present usages diﬀ er 
from ‘race’ in the past?” Let me point out a diﬀ erence but also a similarity 
with past views. With respect to the diﬀ erence: at the time that I know most 
about – the eighteenth century – genetics, which today is central to the dis-
course about race, did, of course, not exist. However – and now I come to 
my point of similarity – by the early part of the twentieth century genes or 
genetics had very much entered notions of race and in fact produced eugen-
ics and, in the political sphere, worse things. It is this similarity that should 
give us cause for concern about today’s resurgence of what we attribute to 
genes and how we deal with any remnants of race notions or other geneti-
cally deﬁ ned categories of humankind.
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Race and Biology. Beyond the 
Perpetual Return of Crisis
Jenny Reardon
Th e use of racial categories in biology has once again arisen as a problem in 
political and scholarly arenas. As the editors of this issue note, “until recently 
there existed a broad consensus among scientists, as well as students of sci-
ence, that racial anthropology belonged to a past thoroughly outdated by the 
combined eﬀ orts of mathematical population genetics and molecular biolo-
gy.” Several other similar moments of consensus preceded this one. In each 
moment, natural scientists, social scientists and the popular press concurred 
that a new powerful science had emerged that could reveal the truth, and 
thus counter social ideologies, about “race”: the science of population gene-
tics in the 1950s, molecular biology in the 1970s, the genome sciences and 
bioinformatics in the 1990s and today. In each case, a crisis re-occurred as 
social ideologies of race once again became associated with biological ideas 
and practices. In the brief space at my disposal here I would like to reﬂ ect on 
what produces this experience of the cyclical return of the problem of race 
in biology. I would like to then oﬀ er a diagnosis of what is unique about the 
current moment of return, and how we might respond to it.
I begin by asking what accounts for the experience of this constant re-
turn of the race problem in biology. I suggest that it is all but guaranteed by 
the conceptual distinctions that have been used to address it. Following the 
Nazi atrocities, nearly every eﬀ ort to address “the race question” in biology 
has presumed that scientists can and should reﬁ ne their use of race so as to 
advance scientiﬁ c knowledge and exclude “social” discrimination (Reardon 
2005, UNESCO 1952). Such endeavours have taken for granted that science 
can and should be strictly delineated from society. Th us, no matter the par-
ticularities of any given claim about race (“race is biologically meaningful 
when it is used to study human evolution” or “race is not biologically mean-
ingful when the goal is to understand mental traits” etc.), each claim depends 
on the following assumptions: the science of race can and should be dis-
tinguished from racist ideologies; natural order exists in a separate domain 
from social order; scientiﬁ c racism results from the latter (ideology, social 
order) posing as the former (science, natural order). I suggest that it is this 
bifurcated conceptual framework – one that delineates science from society, 
natural order from social order – and not any particular answer to “the race 
question” itself, that produces the experience of a perpetual return of a race 
problem in biology: the IQ debates in the 1960s and 1970s; the controversies 
sparked by the 1994 publication of the Th e Bell Curve; Armand Leroi’s 2005 
announcement in the New York Times that race is real; the explosion in the 
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last few years of claims that link genetic variants to particular races (Herrn-
stein 1994, Leroi 2005).
Of course, all architects of post WWII eﬀ orts to erect a protective wall 
between biology and society intended to preclude just these sorts of returns 
(cf. Gayon in this issue). Political leaders and scientists alike built institutions 
and knowledge practices upon conceptual structures that separated biology 
from society to ensure that social biases did not creep into the potent zone 
of science, and create the conditions for the next biologized legitimation of 
discrimination (Reardon 2005). Why did these eﬀ orts fail?
Th ey failed, I and Brody Dunklee and Kara Wentworth argue elsewhere, 
because if one conceives of biology as a distinct realm of knowledge pro-
duction that exists apart from any societal taint, then no one attends to the 
construction of biological concepts and practices of race. Social scientists 
and humanists do not feel obliged, for, after all, biology is supposed to fall 
outside their critical purview. Biologists do not attend to the construction 
of their concepts of race, for they hold their categories to arise from nature, 
not from the social and political realms of human construction. Th e result 
is that biological laboratories become sites where new techniques for distin-
guishing between human beings form without any attendant sociological or 
humanistic analysis.
Th is bifurcated system remains viable as long as what it conceals remains 
palatable. However, once the biological concepts of race, and the political and 
social ideas to which they are conjoined, become extreme – meaning shared 
by few, and generally viewed as racist – then these concepts of race become 
impossible to ignore. At this point, eﬀ orts to purify and spin biology and 
society out into their respective poles collapse. Over the years, sociologists 
and humanists have experienced this collapse as the periodic return of the 
idea of race in science. Biologists have experienced them as the periodic po-
liticization of their science. As Dunklee, Wentworth and I explain: “For both 
sides, a crisis emerges. For the sociologists and humanists, it is that biological 
race has risen again. For the biologists, it is that something extreme enough 
to be recognized as political has emerged within their purportedly apolitical 
discipline. Both are the direct consequence of a system that delineates the 
social and the political from the biological: sociologists and humanists can 
only encounter race’s return within biology when they fail to see it all along; 
biologists can only experience a shock of politicization when the ongoing 
political dimensions of their work are out of view” (Dunklee/Reardon/Went-
worth 2006).
We would appear to be in another such crisis moment of return and po-
liticization. But is this return like all the previous ones? I want to suggest that 
it is not. Let me oﬀ er a few brief observations about this current moment, 
and how we might intervene now so as to perhaps interrupt the seeming 
compulsive return of the race problem in biology.





To understand this current historical conjuncture, I must add one more 
dimension to my explanation of why we experience a seeming compulsive 
return to the problem of race in biology: a spatial-temporal dimension. In 
the past we experienced in diﬀ erent temporal moments the entanglement of 
biology and society and the puriﬁ cation of biology from society, the politi-
cization of biology and its de-politicization, the assertion that there are no 
valid concepts of biological race and the proliferation of biological concepts 
of race. During the Holocaust, for example, the experience for many was one 
of biology and society collapsing into an explosive core, creating biological 
justiﬁ cations for mass extermination of human life. In a diﬀ erent moment, 
after World War II, biologists along with architects of post WWII liberal in-
stitutions attempted to respond to this “race problem” by attempting to spin 
biology and society back out into their separate poles. Th ey, for example, 
produced public documents that proclaimed science to exist in a separate 
domain from society – most notably, the UNESCO Statements on Race pub-
lished in 1950 and 1951 (UNESCO 1952). Similarly, during the ﬁ rst part of 
the twentieth century, nation-states – such as the United States, England and 
Germany – deﬁ ned race in oppressive ways, enabling eugenic policies (Paul 
1995). Th is, for many, represented the politicization of biological studies of 
human diﬀ erences. An era of de-politicization followed when in the second 
half of the twentieth century states, through practices of self-identiﬁ cation, 
purportedly granted the power to deﬁ ne race to individuals, thus eliminating 
the states’ need to draw upon the biological sciences to deﬁ ne race. In each 
case, a temporal distinction existed between the experience of the entangle-
ment of biology and society and the experience of the puriﬁ cation of biology 
from society, the experience of the politicization of (or state involvement in) 
science, and the experience of its de-politicization. Th is temporal separation 
helped to make it possible to diagnose the race problem as a problem created 
by spheres (the social and the scientiﬁ c) encroaching on one another, for 
a diﬀ erent temporal moment oﬀ ered a space for separation: the separation 
of biology from society, truth from politics, and ideology from power. Th e 
belief in separation that resulted created the conditions for the return of the 
race problem in biology.
What diﬀ erentiates the current crisis from past ones is that the space of 
separation has all but collapsed. Increasingly, puriﬁ cation and entanglement, 
politicization and de-politicization, control by the state and individual em-
powerment, the negation of biological concepts of race and their prolifera-
tion happen concurrently. At the same time that genetic ancestry tests act to 
delink race from the state through “individualizing” the experience of racial 
identiﬁ cation, data from these tests are used to build DNA databases that 
support an increasing number of state-organized biopolitical projects.1 At 
the same time that state sponsors of genomic databases, such as the Interna-
tional Haplotype Map Project (HapMap), instruct users of these databases 
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to eschew racial categories in favour of more “precise language,” users of the 
databases in practice use categories such as “European,” “African” and “Asian” 
in a proliferating number of contexts.2 Politicization and de-politicization, 
deﬁ nition of race by the state and deﬁ nition of race by individuals, claims to 
eschew racial categorization and the proliferation of the use of racial catego-
ries occur in the same moment.
Th is synchronicity creates dissonance. Claims by researchers that they 
are not studying race, while at the same time trading in the categories of 
“African,” “Asian,” and “European” (despite the HapMap organizers’ eﬀ orts to 
discipline them into diﬀ erent categorical practices), increasingly cause dis-
ease. Claims that genomics can be a part of individual empowerment, and 
even “recreation,” ring hollow in a time when those same “recreational” ac-
tivities give rise to databases that are used to arbitrate the kind and amount 
of resources an individual will receive.3 A “pure” “non-political” spirit of dis-
covery and adventure cannot account for projects like National Geogra phic’s 
Genographic Project, whose activities link to deep ﬁ nancial and political in-
terests.4
Th ese dissonances create ﬁ ssures in narratives of puriﬁ cation and separa-
tion that in the past have been used to manage the race problem in biology. 
Th ese ﬁ ssures provide us with openings, with possibilities for interruption 
and reﬂ exive awareness. Indeed, in the current moment it would take con-
certed eﬀ ort to not see the production of new social orders of race in the 
production of novel biological orders. In such a moment, we have the chance 
to learn much, and it is politically imperative that we learn as much as we 
can. As scholars of biology, we now are positioned to play an important role 
in creating the reﬂ exive society that Ulrich Beck predicted some 15 years ago 
(Beck 1992). I stop short of predicting this reﬂ exive moment, and only urge 
us towards it. After all, I am too rooted in historical knowledge to believe 
that change happens easily. History tells us that returns are frequent, and cy-
cles sometimes unending. But in the case of race and biology, too often these 
cycles have taken us through catastrophes for us to not work for something 
diﬀ erent this time.
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1 Such as DNA racial proﬁ ling to ﬁ nd individuals wanted by the state; race-based medicine; 
etc., see Harmon 2006, Simons 2003, Herper 2004, Kahn 2007.
2 For “precise” instructions to refer to populations studied in the International Haplotype 
Map, see http://www.hapmap.org/citinghapmap.html.en. For how these populations are in 
practice being referred to, see Keinan et. al. 2007, Hoggart et. al. 2008.
3 In particular, in the domains of health and education; see Bolnick et. al. 2007.
4 In National Geographic’s current literature, they describe the Genographic Project as a 
“non-medical, non-political, non-proﬁ t and non-commercial” [emphasis added] initiati-
ve. See, for example, https://www3.nationalgeographic.com/genographic/silk_route_an-
nouncement.html (accessed November 28, 2007). For an analysis of Genographic, see 
Reardon , forthcoming.
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Categories in Biomedical Research
George T. H. Ellison, Richard Tutton, Simon M. Outram, Paul Martin, 
Richard Ashcroft and Andrew Smart
As an interdisciplinary team exploring the use of racial categories in biomed-
ical research from the perspective of epidemiology (GTHE), anthropology 
(GTHE, SMO), sociology (RT, AS), bioethics (RA) and science and technol-
ogy studies (RT, PM, AS), what we hope to oﬀ er to this trans-disciplinary 
dialogue on “race and genomics” in the NTM. Journal of the History of Sci-
ence, Technology and Medicine draws on: our analysis of the longstanding 
debate within the biomedical literature concerning the meaning and aetio-
logical utility of “race” as well as interviews with 22 geneticists working on 
the editorial boards of high-impact genetics and biomedical journals and 36 
researchers working on UK-based biobanking and pharmacogenetic projects 
– interviews which examined variation in the conceptualisation and opera-
tionalisation of racial categories, and the perceived utility of these categories 
in the analytical design of research, the interpretation of research ﬁ ndings, 
and the translation thereof across diﬀ erent research and clinical contexts 
(see Outram/Ellison 2006a, Martin et al. 2007).
At the outset, however, we feel it is important to acknowledge that 
much of what we hope to contribute here has already been said, and said 
more eloquently, by a good many commentators and analysts before us. 
Not least amongst these is the Loyola University epidemiologist Richard 
S. Cooper, whose 2003 article in the International Journal of Epidemiology 
(bearing the uncannily similar title “Race, genes, and health – new wine in 
old bottles”) addressed many of the questions posed by the organisers of 
this trans-disciplinary dialogue. Cooper felt that advances in genetic tech-





nology should have been able to resolve the contentious and questionable 
use of racial categories as “surrogates for genetic eﬀ ects at the population 
level” (i.e. as markers for potentially important diﬀ erences in genetic varia-
tion amongst human populations) during the important period – what an-
thropologist Mike Fortun (2007) has called the “meantime” – between the 
conceptualisation and invention of genomic technologies and their wide-
spread use in biomedical research. Richard Cooper also recognised that 
there was a “tension between reaﬃ  rmation of tradition and transforma-
tion of biological concepts” in which the new genomic technologies have, 
somewhat paradoxically, been used both to conﬁ rm that there are meas-
urable diﬀ erences in genetic variation between traditional “racial” groups 
and to demonstrate that these diﬀ erences are far smaller than those found 
between individuals within such groups (cf. Reardon in this issue). And 
although Cooper has long questioned the value of using “racial” categories 
as markers for genetic variation in biomedical research (see also: Cooper 
1993, Cooper/Kaufman 1998) – even for the modest “racial” diﬀ erences in 
genetic variation that have been conﬁ rmed by advances in genomic tech-
nology – he accepts that the meaning of these diﬀ erences in genetic varia-
tion remain open to interpretation, and that the claim that “race has little 
or no biological [i.e. genetic] meaning” has been an unhelpful “irritant to 
geneticists who see the importance of population variation [in genetics] in 
an array of conditions.”
Certainly, many of the geneticists and biomedical researchers we inter-
viewed expressed palpable irritation at what they felt to be the “politically 
correct” view that, as Cooper (2003) put it, “race has little or no biological 
meaning” (see: Outram /Ellison 2006b, Smart et al. 2008). And even though 
they were, for the most part, well aware of the limited reliability and valid-
ity of racial categories as markers of diﬀ erences in genetic variation, they 
nonetheless saw the evidence of such diﬀ erences between “racial” groups 
– however modest and context-speciﬁ c these diﬀ erences might be – as com-
pelling grounds for using racial categories in their research as markers of ge-
netic diﬀ erence (Outram/Ellison 2006a, 2006b, Tutton et al. 2008). Likewise, 
while most of these interviewees acknowledged that the diﬀ erences in dis-
ease phenotypes observed amongst diﬀ erent “racial” groups were the prod-
uct of gene-environment interactions rather than of genes per se; and that 
cultural and socioeconomic diﬀ erences between “racial” groups meant these 
groups were often exposed to very diﬀ erent “environments,” the interviewees 
remained pre-occupied with the potential impact of “racial” diﬀ erences in 
genetic variation on the diﬀ erential distribution of disease phenotypes by 
“race” and with how they might best use racial categories to explore these 
genetic diﬀ erences in their research.
Th us, to a large extent, we have found little evidence that advances in 
genomic technology have led to a comprehensive re-appraisal of the mean-
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ing of “race” within biomedical research, nor that it has undermined the 
perceived utility of racial categories as markers for diﬀ erences in genetic 
variation (however ill-deﬁ ned, context-speciﬁ c and modest these diﬀ erences 
might be). It therefore appears that the potential for genomic technologies to 
resolve the contentious and questionable use of “racial” categories as mark-
ers of genetic variation in biomedical research has yet to be realised – a 
suitable point of departure from which to address each of the ﬁ ve questions 
posed by the organisers of this trans-disciplinary dialogue.
What is it about “racial” categories that lets them persist, 
even in the high-tech world of present day genomics and 
systems biology?
Given what we have found in our analyses of the biomedical literature and 
interviews with geneticists and biomedical researchers, there are perhaps 
three potential answers to this question. First, amongst many geneticists 
and biomedical scientists there seems to be a deep-seated and somewhat 
unacknowledged or unreﬂ ective attachment to racial categories as impor-
tant markers of biological (both phenotypic and genotypic) diﬀ erences. Th is 
is the case despite the fact that many of these scientists know that racial 
categories only oﬀ er unreliable and imprecise markers for even those, very 
modest, diﬀ erences in genetic variation which occur amongst human popu-
lations. Likewise, this view persists even though these scientists are acutely 
aware that the notion of “race” remains politically sensitive while the use 
of racial categories in scientiﬁ c research has the potential to imply that the 
scientists involved are, in some way, “racist”.
Second, there appear to be a growing number of scientists, and lay peo-
ple alike, who have been convinced by biomedical reports of phenotypic 
diﬀ erences between “racial” groups and by geneticists who claim to be able 
to identify “racial” ancestry using genetic information. Th ese reports and 
claims are persuasive evidence that racial categories refer to intrinsically 
biological (and probably genetically-determined) entities and that it is not 
only relevant but also important to use these categories in scientiﬁ c re-
search as if they did so. Finally, and beyond the realm of the “pure” biologi-
cal sciences (and their preoccupation with “race” as an analytical category 
equivalent to “sub-species”) it seems clear that racial categories continue to 
have substantial salience as socio-political identities in societies beset with 
racial inequality, whether as a result of the social heritability of historical 
events (such as slavery, colonisation, and apartheid) or as a consequence 
of contemporary stigmatisation, stereotyping and discrimination (and the 
biological consequences of these as a result of the “embodiment” of disad-
vantage; Krieger 2005).





Is this resilience just an illusion?
As such it appears that the resilience of “race” as a biologically meaningful 
entity is far from illusory, whether as an imprecise proxy for modest intrinsic 
diﬀ erences in genetic variation, or as a marker for the extrinsic cultural and 
structural factors which generate and reinforce the embodiment of pheno-
typic diﬀ erences amongst “racial groups.” Indeed, if anything, the use of the 
new genomic technologies to conduct “ancestry testing” using traditional ra-
cial categories appears to have strengthened the resilience of “race” because 
it successfully exaggerates not only the extent of genetic diﬀ erences between 
“racial” groups but also their potential utility (albeit only for generating es-
timates of racial ancestry based on genetic information). In many respects 
this goes beyond the circular arguments that have reproduced the notion 
of “race” as a biological reality since the ﬁ rst international attempts to dis-
credit this (UNESCO 1950, 1951). Th ese arguments interpreted the biologi-
cal (phenotypic and genotypic) diﬀ erences between “racial” groups (which 
are created primarily by the way these groups are categorised and treated by 
extrinsic social forces) as evidence that there were intrinsic (genetic) diﬀ er-
ences between these groups that were responsible for the biological (pheno-
typic and genotypic) diﬀ erences observed and thereby warranted diﬀ erential 
treatment along these grounds (which, in turn, leads to further biological 
diﬀ erences… and so on…).
Th ese arguments have now been augmented by what appears to be an 
undeniable fact – that there are identiﬁ able (albeit imprecise, context-spe-
ciﬁ c and modest) diﬀ erences in genetic variation between “racial” groups 
– which no longer appears to require any conﬂ ation of extrinsic with intrin-
sic causes or of phenotypic with genotypic diﬀ erences to sustain the belief 
that human “races” are naturally occurring, genetically distinct subspecies. 
Instead, this new ideology is sustained simply by ignoring the fact that racial 
categories are socially constructed, and that the diﬀ erences in genetic vari-
ation observed amongst “racial” groups are a consequence of the way these 
are classiﬁ ed, and would be very diﬀ erent if we classiﬁ ed such groups diﬀ er-
ently. Unfortunately, this may prove to be an even harder critique to explain 
to lay people and scientists than the error of conﬂ ating extrinsic with intrin-
sic causes and phenotypic with genotypic diﬀ erences.
Has “race” acquired very different meanings in different 
historical settings?
Although many biologists might disagree, it seems likely that the “species” 
is the only “naturally-occurring” biological category, and that all other taxo-
nomic categories (including “subspecies” or “races”) have always been socially 
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constructed and somewhat arbitrary categories of convenience, regardless of 
the organisms they are used to classify (be these trees, snails or peoples; see 
Gayon in this issue on bacteria, however). In this respect, we would argue that 
“race,” as applied to humans, has always had the same proximate meaning re-
gardless of the historical or cultural setting – i.e. it has always been a socially 
constructed and context-speciﬁ c classiﬁ catory system based on phenotypic, 
geographical and/or cultural characteristics which creates group identities 
that are salient both to those doing the classifying and those being classi-
ﬁ ed (if only as a result of being classiﬁ ed in this way). Nonetheless, in the 
way “races” are classiﬁ ed and subsequently treated, they ultimately display 
measurable (and occasionally pronounced) biological diﬀ erences which can 
be taken as evidence of the profound genetic diﬀ erences claimed by many 
“racial” scientists. Th ese diﬀ erences comprise not only the substantial pheno-
typic diﬀ erences created by the diﬀ erential treatment of “racial” groups, but 
also the modest genotypic diﬀ erences created by the way in which geographi-
cal and socio-cultural diﬀ erences in genetic variation are arbitrarily allocated 
to diﬀ erent “racial” groups when these are socially constructed.
Th us, “race” has always had a number of diﬀ erent meanings which are 
related to one another as a result of the social and biological characteristics 
used in classiﬁ cation and the social and biological consequences of this clas-
siﬁ cation. As such, some of these meanings are derived from fallacious sci-
entiﬁ c theories about “natural” and genetically-distinct human subspecies, 
while others reﬂ ect the consequences of scientists and lay people acting as if 
these theories were real. Th is duality of meaning has always existed, simply 
as a result of the way in which one meaning reinforces the other and the ease 
with which the nature of the link between them (the social constructedness 
of all scientiﬁ c facts) can be overlooked or ignored. Indeed, this analysis ex-
plains why repeated attempts to discredit the notion of “race” as an invalid 
scientiﬁ c construct have failed to persuade generations of scientists faced 
with compelling evidence of diﬀ erences in phenotypic variation amongst 
groups classiﬁ ed as “races” and with the plausible explanation oﬀ ered by “ra-
cial” science that most (rather than few) of these diﬀ erences were predomi-
nantly (rather than partially) the result of intrinsic genetic diﬀ erences be-
tween “racial” groups (rather than diﬀ erences in environmental exposure).
However, what has changed perhaps, with the advent of advances in ge-
nomic technology, is that the nature of the link between theories of diﬀ er-
ence and the realisation/production of diﬀ erence – what we have called the 
“social constructedness of scientiﬁ c facts” – seems to have been permanently 
lost by the evidence of irrefutable diﬀ erences in genetic variation amongst 
“racial” groups (albeit modest diﬀ erences if compared with the frequency of 
alleles present in all “racial” groups). Th is is the evidence that the geneticists 
and biomedical researchers we interviewed use to justify their argument that 
genetically-distinct “races” do exist and that it is important to take account 





of these diﬀ erences by using racial categories in their research designs. Fu-
ture research on genetic diversity – not least on variation in ‘non-coding’ 
DNA and DNA repeats, a modest proportion of which also seems to diﬀ er 
by “race” – seems unlikely to unsettle this view. Meanwhile, there has been 
no equivalent technological breakthrough in the characterisation or meas-
urement of what biologists routinely call “the” environment (and what social 
scientists recognise as a complex interplay of innumerable environmental 
characteristics) with which to challenge the resurgence of biological deter-
minism and the geneticisation of “racial” diﬀ erences. Instead, the limited role 
that genetic variation is thought to play in the diﬀ erences in phenotypic vari-
ation observed amongst human populations – at least by critics of biological 
determinism – is only likely to be recognised once we fully understand and 
can measure environmental exposures.
How does “race” in its present usages differ from “race” 
in the past?
Our research with geneticists and biomedical researchers therefore suggests 
that the key diﬀ erence between present and past usages of “race” lies in the 
greater certainty (i.e. the stronger evidence) these scientists now have that 
diﬀ erences in genetic variation between “racial” groups exist. Th is is some-
what unexpected, because the evidence generated by recent advances in ge-
nomic technology conﬁ rms that these diﬀ erences are very modest, not least 
in comparison to the diﬀ erences found between individuals within “racial” 
groups. However, it is also surprising because our reviews of the literature 
suggested that social scientists, including a number of vocal epidemiologists, 
had recently made considerable progress towards reclaiming “race” from the 
biological sciences and recasting this as an analytical concept which reﬂ ects 
the lived experiences of groups classiﬁ ed as “races” and the phenotypic “em-
bodiment” of historical and contemporary discrimination on the grounds of 
“race” (Krieger 2005).
Instead, far from embracing “race” as a socially-constructed marker of 
identity associated with cultural diﬀ erence, socioeconomic (dis-)advan-
tage and the phenotypic consequences thereof, it seems that an increasing 
number of biomedical researchers may be reverting to a more traditional 
“scientiﬁ c” deﬁ nition of “racial” groups. Th ese are being seen as “genetically-
distinct subspecies” – even though this is an inaccurate representation of 
the extent, nature and origins of social and biological diﬀ erences between 
“racial” groups – and are seeking to distinguish between “race” as a “scien-
tiﬁ c” entity and the related concept of “ethnicity” as a “social” entity. Th is 
is evident in the conscious decision made by many of the geneticists and 
biomedical researchers we interviewed, who have responded to the socio-
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political sensitivity of “race” by using ethnic classiﬁ cations and labels, even 
though they felt that “race” better described the analytical concept they actu-
ally sought to employ.
In this way, it seems that the present usage of “race” appears to be revert-
ing back to the more traditional (and hitherto discredited) notion of “ge-
netically-distinct subspecies” in at least some contemporary research in both 
the natural and social sciences. Indeed, this can also be found elsewhere in 
society and social policy. As such it appears that attempts to recast “race” as 
a discredited and fallacious scientiﬁ c concept – albeit one that nonetheless 
had substantive, resilient, pernicious and, to some extent, “heritable” social 
and biological consequences – has been somewhat less successful. Instead, 
the immediate consequence of advances in genomic technology appears to 
have been a clearer, but nonetheless illusory, distinction between the sci-
entiﬁ c concept of “race” (meaning genetically distinct subspecies) and the 
social concept “ethnicity” (meaning socio-culturally distinct identities).
Which recent social and political developments have triggered 
its renewed signifi cance?
Th e geneticists and biomedical researchers we interviewed mentioned a 
number of social and political developments which had inﬂ uenced the way 
they operationalised “racial” categories in their work. As mentioned earlier, 
the growing socio-political sensitivity of “race” had led many to adopt “eth-
nic” labels and categories to avoid any suggestion that they or their work was 
“racist” – either as a result of any prior belief in intrinsic “racial” diﬀ erences 
(something many, nonetheless, believed to be an important inﬂ uence in their 
work) or any desire to prove that some “racial” groups were “healthier” than 
others (although many, nonetheless, used “racial” disparities in health to jus-
tify their racialised analytical designs). And while many of the interviewees 
implied that this shift in the classiﬁ cation and labelling of research partici-
pants had been prompted more by “political correctness” than by a change in 
their theoretical understanding, some also drew on relatively recent legisla-
tive changes. For example, the US National Institutes of Health Revitaliza-
tion Act (1993) and the UK Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) – which 
encourage or require scientists to ensure that their study samples reﬂ ect the 
diversity of the wider population and can therefore identify any diﬀ erences 
between diﬀ erent subpopulations (including “racial” and “ethnic” groups). 
Despite their misgivings – not least about the use of “ethnicity” when they 
actually meant “race” – the geneticists and biomedical scientists perceived 
a number of analytical beneﬁ ts resulting from a shift in terminology (from 
“race” to “ethnicity”) and the adoption of socio-political classiﬁ cations (such 
as those developed by the US Oﬃ  ce of Management and Budget and by the 





UK Oﬃ  ce of National Statistics). Th ese included: the possibility that socio-
political “ethnic” categories might be easier to operationalize and translate 
across diﬀ erent scientiﬁ c and social contexts, and might even oﬀ er more reli-
able and accurate measures of diﬀ erences in genetic diversity associated with 
geographical and socio-cultural ancestry.
Conclusion
Our analyses suggest that the resurgence of “race” in genetics and biomedi-
cal research as a result of recent advances in genomic technology – which 
have conﬁ rmed that modest diﬀ erences in genetic variation between “racial” 
groups exist – does seem to be an example of “old wine in new bottles.” 
Past critiques of human “races” as “genetically-distinct subspecies” have tra-
ditionally adopted two distinct approaches. Th e ﬁ rst has pointed out that 
diﬀ erences in genetic variation amongst “racial” groups (however these have 
been classiﬁ ed) simply reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in the frequency of alleles across 
a modest number of polymorphic genetic loci, and that these diﬀ erences 
are much smaller than those found between individuals within each “racial” 
group. Th e second has focused on the view that “racial” categories are not 
natural entities but are ﬂ uid, context-speciﬁ c, social constructions which bet-
ter reﬂ ect the importance of phenotypic, geographical and cultural factors 
to the classiﬁ cation of group identities, and the consequences of this clas-
siﬁ cation on the subsequent biology of group members. While it appeared 
that the second of these arguments was gaining ground – not least because 
the more social concept “ethnicity” has evolved as a more popular way of 
characterising human populations than the more biological concept “race” 
– the inherent complexity of the ﬁ rst argument, which makes it conceptually 
challenging to non-biologists, together with the fact that it acknowledges 
that there are some diﬀ erences in genetic variation between “racial” groups, 
left the door open for the way in which “racial” groups are being redeﬁ ned as 
“genetically-distinct subspecies” following recent advances in genomic tech-
nology. And while this technology will permit the development of alterna-
tive classiﬁ cations of human populations that display greater diﬀ erences in 
genetic diversity than traditional or contemporary “racial” groups in ways 
that would make these more valid for genetics and biomedical research, it 
seems unlikely that these will do away with the pernicious notion of “races” 
as genetically-distinct subspecies. Th is is because these new classiﬁ cations 
are likely to be linked to previous “racial” classiﬁ cations, generating estimates 
of co-membership in each set of “groups” that will facilitate the interpre-
tation of data from previous studies and surveys in which only traditional 
“racial” categories were used. It is also because these new classiﬁ cations have 
the potential to become socially salient, and thereby susceptible to social 
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discrimination, as ostensibly “new races.” Th us it seems likely that advances 
in genomic technology have, and will continue to, strengthen the perceived 
validity of “race” and the perceived utility of using “racial” categories, both 
old and new, in genetics and biomedical research.
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